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Chapter 12
Risk Budgeting for the Canadian Pension
Plan Investment Board
Sterling Gunn and Tracy Livingstone
The Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) was created in 1999
to manage the surplus contributions of the Canada Pension Plan (CPP). In
its early days, CPPIB fund management was outsourced to external man-
agers who passively managed to market indexes. By 2005, the group had
built internal active management capabilities and was moving away from
the outsourcing business model. While management was already operating
under a total portfolio approach, the methodology was refined to explicitly
consider trade-offs between risk and return at the fund level, with the
development of the Risk–Return–Accountability Framework. In turn, this
prompted the design and implementation of a risk-budgeting framework.
This chapter explains why risk budgeting is necessary to help public fund
managers handle contributions not needed to pay current benefits. In what
follows, we first discuss the origins of the CPP and the CPPIB. Next, we take
up the implementation of risk budgeting as an integral part of business
planning.
Origins of the CPP1
During the 1960s, Canada was ‘fully engaged in building a welfare state that
would render the ravages of the Great Depression in the 1930s a thing of
the past’ (Little 2008: 2). In 1963, a minority government was elected on a
party platform that included a national pension plan and national health
insurance. Discussions and negotiations between the Federal government
and the nine of the 10 provinces continued until an agreement was
reached in 1966 to initiate the CPP. The province of Quebec administers
its own pension plan, parallel to the CPP, known as the Quebec Pension
Plan (QPP).
Although it is a defined benefit (DB) plan, the CPP was never meant to
provide full or near-full support for a beneficiary; rather it was intended to
be part of the answer to senior poverty. The CPP is a component of
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Canada’s three-tier national pension system. The first tier consists of two
government support programs paid out of general revenues. Old Age
Security (OAS) was put in place in 1952, and it provides a low level of
income primarily to senior citizens who never worked for a wage. The
Guaranteed Income Supplement (put in place in 1967) is means-tested,
and it offers further support to seniors who depend almost entirely on the
OAS for their income. The second tier includes the CPP and workplace
pensions. These pensions may be DB or defined contribution (DC); ben-
eficiaries and often their employers contribute to these plans, enabling the
funds to grow in a tax-deferred environment. The third tier consists of
personal saving, whether in a tax-deferred Registered Retirement Savings
Plan or in some other saving vehicle.
The design of the CPP was a triumph of compromise. Federal and
provincial jurisdiction in Canada separates accountability and authority
in ways that are not always intuitive. For instance, the Federal government
has exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law, but the provinces have jurisdic-
tion over the administration of justice. The health-care system is adminis-
tered by the provinces, but substantial funding is provided by the Federal
government. In fact, the provinces had full jurisdiction for pensions until
the constitutional amendment that instituted OAS in 1952. ‘Nonaged
benefits’ such as disability and survivor benefits remained part of provincial
jurisdiction until a subsequent constitutional amendment in 1965 allowed
the Federal government to provide these benefits as well. The end result
was shared accountability for pensions and a national solution that includ-
ed pension benefits, disability payments, and survivor benefits. An addi-
tional compromise was the change process inserted in the Act. Changes to
the CPP require agreement from two-thirds of the provinces with two-thirds
of the population, a higher threshold than required for amending the
Canadian constitution.2 From the outset of the negotiations, Quebec
chose not to participate in the CPP, and formed its own provincial plan,
the QPP. However, agreement was reached between the Federal govern-
ment and Quebec such that the legislation supporting the CPP and the
QPP are identical. The contributions and benefits are the same, and the
plan is portable between Quebec and the other provinces.
As originally structured, the CPP did not focus on intergenerational
fairness and equity. The generation of Canadians that had lived through
the Great Depression and World War II had little opportunity to put aside
savings, and faced a poor retirement. The CPP was designed to ensure
some support would be available for them, regardless of the length of their
participation. Full benefits were to be phased in after the first 10 years of
contributions. ‘At the extreme, it would be possible for some people to
contribute for only ten years and then retire with full CPP benefits for the
rest of their lives’ (Little 2008: 36). As illustrated in Table 12.1, the return
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on contributions was substantial for the first beneficiaries, born in 1911,
who retired with full benefits in 1976. The return for later beneficiaries
would be significantly lower. In any case, the CPP continues to provide a
fully portable, fully indexed, and effectively risk-free pension promise.
‘Given plausible inflation-indexed bond returns the CPP would need to
charge significantly higher sustainable contribution rates in the 11 to 12½
percent range if it faced the total costs of private annuity providers’
(Arnold et al. 2009: 15). On a risk-adjusted basis, the CPP was a great
deal for the earlier participants, and it remains a good deal for later
participants.
The Evolution of the CPP
The CPP was changed several times over the next 20 years. The retirement
age was reduced from 69 in 1966 to 65 in 1970. Both the CPP and the QPP
enhanced benefits during the 1970s and added full indexing to inflation
in 1974. Survivor benefits were extended to widowers as well as widows.
In 1984, the QPP brought in a provision for early retirement with a
reduction in benefits paid; the CPP followed suit in 1987. For the first
20 years, alterations to the CPP involved increases or enhancements to
benefits; little attention was devoted to long-term funding considerations.
The original contribution rate was 3.6 percent of salary, shared equally
between employees and employers, though it was recognized that
Table 12.1 Internal rates of return on contributions: Canadian
Pension Plan (CPP) (1910–2000)
Birth year Nominal (%) Real (%)
1910 33.6 25.3
1920 21.9 14.2
1930 15.6 9.6
1940 10.4 6.2
1950 7.2 4.1
1960 5.6 3.0
1970 4.9 2.4
1980 4.8 2.2
1990 4.7 2.2
2000 4.7 2.2
Sources: TOCA (2009) for birth years 1910–30; TOCA (2006) for birth
years 1940–2000.
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3.6 percent would not be sufficient over the long term. CPP retirement
benefits were capped at 25 percent of Yearly Maximum Pensionable Earn-
ings (related to average earnings), and benefits were inflation-adjusted
(initially capped at 2 percent per year). The system was mainly pay-as-you-go,
after accumulating 2 years of benefit payments in a buffer fund. Other
than a small amount of cash retained for liquidity, the monies collected
were used to purchase nonmarketable provincial bonds (i.e., the funds
were loaned to the provinces at an interest rate equal to Government of
Canada 20-year bonds). Until 1999 when the first cash transfers from the
Federal government were provided to CPPIB, the basic financing structure
remained the same.
Full benefits were first paid to participants in the CPP in 1976. In its first
10 years, the CPP was collecting money at the full 3.6 percent contribution
rate, far in excess of what was needed to pay benefits. As illustrated
in Figure 12.1, by 1975, while the contribution rate was still fixed at
3.6 percent, the pay-as-you-go rate was only 1.5 percent though it was
climbing steadily.
It was known that there would come a time when the pay-as-you-go rate
would reach and surpass the fixed contribution rate. The Chief Actuary of
the CPP projected that this would occur in 1985 but it came earlier. By
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Figure 12.1 Projected pay-as-you-go rates for the Canada Pension Plan (CPP).
Sources: Authors’ calculations derived from TOCA (2006) and CPPIB (various
years).
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1983, the cost of the CPP had reached 3.7 percent but contributions
remained at 3.6 percent. The Stewards of the CPP, the Ministers of Finance
for the Federal government, and the nine participating provincial govern-
ments responded with a 5-year schedule of increases of 0.2 percent, starting
in 1987, and thereafter raising them 0.15 percent each year for the follow-
ing 20 years. The problem was thus alleviated in the short term but not
solved in the longer term.
The contribution rate versus the pay-as-you-go rate was not the entire
source of system financing, since the CPP received additional revenue from
interest earned on the surpluses loaned to the provinces. Thus, total system
revenues were contributions plus interest received on the provincial loans.
In 1987, the Chief Actuary forecast that total revenues would be sufficient
to pay benefits for another 10 years, until sometime between 1995 and
2000. This day of reckoning again came early: in 1993, the CPP began to
use its capital to pay benefits.
The new fiscal responsibility
Thirty years after the launch of the CPP, the issue of financing the plan for
future generations finally hit the front page: Canadians had lost confidence
that the CPP would provide them with retirement income. An Angus Reid
public opinion survey in 1993 found that only 17 percent of Canadians
believed CPP benefits would remain the same in their retirement (HRSDC
1995: 7). Another 50 percent believed that the CPP would be providing
significantly reduced benefits and 31 percent believed the plan would no
longer exist.
The Chief Actuary’s 15th review of the CPP in 1995 confirmed that this
lack of confidence in the CPP was warranted. With the demographic and
economic assumptions in the 15th review, the Office of the Chief Actuary
(OCA) forecasted the plan was going to run out of money by 2015, mean-
ing that, as structured, the plan was unsustainable with the current
contribution rate structure. In fact, in 1995, the OCA forecasted that a
pay-as-you-go contribution rate would be 14.2 percent by 2030 to sustain
the CPP. Stakeholders were concerned that such a high contribution level
would create intergenerational inequities, inhibit economic growth, and
stifle job creation.
A new government was elected in 1993 on a platform of reducing
Canada’s dependence on deficit financing. The first budget in 1994 ran a
deficit, although it was reduced from the previous year. The next year, Paul
Martin, the Minister of Finance at the time, put a new budget in place that
turned federal finances around, and in 1997–8, led to the first in a series of
11 budget surpluses. These surpluses caused Canada’s federal debt as a
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percentage of GDP to drop from a peak of 68.4 percent in 1997–8 to 29.8
percent in 2007–8. Although some of Canada’s fiscal house was being put
in order, the long-term status of the CPP remained a serious challenge.
Nevertheless, one of the compromises put into place in 1966 meant the
Federal government could not fix the CPP unilaterally: two-thirds of the
provinces with two-thirds of the population would need to agree on any
proposed changes.
The day of reckoning
In February 1996, the Federal and provincial governments of Canada
issued a joint document entitled ‘Information Paper for Consultations on
the Canada Pension Plan.’ This document ‘provide(d) Canadians with an
opportunity to assess the challenges facing the CPP, form their own opi-
nions, and make their views known during upcoming consultations’
(TFPTGC 1996: 7). It laid out the choices the governments were consider-
ing and the potential outcomes of those choices. More significantly, the
document asked questions of the participants in the CPP and looked for
answers: ‘How high can the rates go before they become unaffordable? . . .
What is the appropriate balance between contribution rate increases and
changes to benefits? . . . If a fuller funding approach to the financing of the
CPP were adopted, a much larger CPP fund would build up. . . . Should CPP
funds be invested so as to earn maximum returns? How could this be
done?’ (TFPTGC 1996: 47).
These questions made it clear what the governments were asking the
stakeholders of the CPP to consider: increased contribution rates, reduced
benefits, and a much larger reserve fund. And in a series of meetings held
across the country in 1996, the CPP’s stakeholders responded with a clear
message: the CPP should be maintained. The balancing act between
increased contributions and reduced benefits was fundamental to the
discussion, but the issue of a bigger fund, and what to do with the money,
was also key.
The necessity of increased contributions was recognized. There was
general mistrust of the government’s ability to manage a large fund, and
concern about the impact such a fund would have on the Canadian capital
markets. However, it was clear that depending on a portfolio of nonmarke-
table government bonds invested at below market rates was not a viable
investment policy to sustain the system for future generations of Canadians.
Instead the preferred outcome was to be a professional investment organi-
zation, managing the resulting fund at arm’s length from government,
specifically exempt from government interference, and ‘maximizing re-
turn without undue risk of loss’ (CPPIB Act 1997).
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The 1997 agreement
Several changes intended to improve CPP sustainability were proposed in
1997 by the finance ministers of the Federal and provincial governments.
Legislation was enacted that put in place a series of contribution rate
increases and modestly reduced the growth of future benefits. In addition,
the legislation introduced a default mechanism for adjusting the contribu-
tion rate should the Chief Actuary ever deem the contribution rate to be
insufficient. Agreement was reached to raise contribution rates to 9.9
percent by 2003, a level viewed as sufficient to sustain the CPP as a partially
funded plan. As illustrated in Figure 12.2, the pay-as-you-go rate exceeded
the contribution rate in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, the steady
increases in the contribution rate surpassed the pay-as-you-go rate by 2000.
Even though the pay-as-you-go rate after 2020 was projected to exceed the
contribution rate, the investment income from the Fund is forecasted to be
sufficient to sustain the CPP.
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Figure 12.2 Projected pay-as-you-go rates versus legislated rates for the Canada
Pension Plan (CPP). Sources: Authors’ calculations derived from TOCA (2006)
and CPPIB (various years).
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Early days of the CPPIB
This 1997 legislation also created the CPPIB, a federal crown corporation
that operates as an independent professional investment organization.
While most Canadian crown corporations are run by the government with
a specific mandate administered by the appropriate Minister of the Canadi-
an Parliament, CPPIB is specifically exempt from Divisions I through IV of
Part X of the Financial Administration Act that would havemade it ultimate-
ly accountable to the Minister of Finance. The founding Board of Directors
of CPPIB was assembled in 1998, chosen from the provinces and territories
to provide a diversity of views and carefully selected to ensure the Board is
composed of professionals with relevant experiences and skill. The inde-
pendence of CPPIB and its Board of Directors from the Federal and provin-
cial governments is central to the firm’s governance: Federal and provincial
government involvement in the management of CPPIB, defined in the
Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act, is limited to the appointment
of the members of the Board of Directors. Apart from appointing the
members of the Board, the government remains at arm’s length from
CPPIB operations. A stringent code of conduct stipulates that any attempt
by any level of government to influence investment decisions, hiring prac-
tices, or procurement must be appropriately escalated within the organiza-
tion in order to determine what appropriate action should be taken.
The first transfer of funds from the Federal government to CPPIB
occurred in March 1999, and by the end of the month – also the end of
the fiscal year – CPPIB had $12 million in investment assets (CPPIB 1999)
as reported in the first annual report. That first report also contained
projections from the Federal government that the Fund would grow to
$88 billion by 2008. The size of the CPP Fund increased rapidly over the
next 5 years. Growth came from excess contributions flowing in from
contributors and positive investment returns. By June 30, 2005, the Fund
had reached $87 billion, almost 3 years ahead of the forecast. By March 31,
2008, the Fund had reached $122.8 billion.
For the first year, the Canadian equity in the CPP Fund was managed
passively, as per the legislation. In 2000, the CPPIB Act was revised to allow
50 percent of the Canadian equity in the CPP Fund to be managed actively.
And then in 2001, the Act was revised again to allow 100 percent active
management. Foreign investments were restricted until the Foreign Prop-
erty Rule was repealed, effective June 2005. And, even though there were
no restrictions on active management after 2001, for the most part, the
Fund was still passively managed (Raymond 2009). The risk of the Fund was
measured, but investment decisions were motivated by passively managing
to a set of benchmarks rather than the risk a particular investment might
create.
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Initial Risk and Performance Concepts at CPPIB
During its early years, CPPIB performance was compared to a set of bench-
marks including a real rate of return calculated by the OCA. By 2004,
CPPIB had also adopted the risk-adjusted net value-added (RANVA) per-
formance measure developed by Keith Ambachtsheer (1996). RANVA,
defined as the gross return on assets less the return on a risk-free asset
(Rassets), costs (C), and a charge on risk capital (º Risk), is similar to many
of the risk-adjusted performance measures used by banks and other finan-
cial institutions:
RANVA ¼Rassets  ðRriskfree þ C þ l RiskÞ
Ambachtsheer defined the risk-free rate as ‘that economic return which
would be certain to keep a fully funded plan fully funded’ and he further
stated ‘the best estimate of such a return is the return on a portfolio of
default-free bonds with the same duration and inflation indexation as
those implicit in the accrued pension liabilities’ (Ambachtsheer 1996).
He acknowledged there was no single right way to measure either the risks
taken by a pension fund or assess the risk charge needed to calculate
RANVA, but he argued that RANVA was for people ‘who would rather
measure the right things imperfectly than either measure the wrong things
perfectly, or measure nothing of consequence at all’ (Ambachtsheer
1996).
The CPPIB RANVA implementation adopted Canadian government real
return bonds (RRBs) as the ‘minimum-risk’ portfolio (a substitute for the
risk-free asset called for in the RANVA model). These bonds were thought
to be a reasonable proxy for the CPP net liabilities. Risk capital was esti-
mated using a 90th percentile value-at-risk (VaR) measure of the asset–
liability mismatch. Yet the CPPIB implementation diverged from the
RANVA specification in several ways. First, the CPP was a partially funded
plan and was always intended to be only partially funded with surpluses
intended as a buffer. This was very different from other pension plans and
from the fully funded plan Ambachtsheer had envisioned. Second, the
CPPIB RANVA implementation modeled the plan’s net cash flows rather
than just the liabilities. The cash flows (annual contributions less benefits
paid) from the CPP plan are forecast to be positive until roughly 2020, at
which point benefits paid are projected to exceed contributions collected
and some proportion of investment income would be used to pay benefits
(see Figure 12.3).3
Third, Ambachtsheer’s approach had assumed the CPP net liabilities
could be represented by a portfolio of RRBs. In fact, however, CPP net
liabilities differ significantly from the liabilities of a typical, fully funded
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plan or that of a bond portfolio. As a result, CPPIB moved away from the
RANVA construct and developed a more sophisticated approach that
modeled the net liabilities directly rather than through proxies (James
2007; Ross 2007). In addition, Ambachtsheer’s risk-free asset was assumed
to have returns sufficient to maintain the sustainability of the plan, but
CPPIB’s chosen proxy, RRBs, did not. In fact, given the Stewards’ policy
decision to cap contributions at 9.9 percent, the Chief Actuary’s forecast
indicated CPPIB needed to generate long-term real returns exceeding
4 percent, well beyond any reasonable long-term return expectation for
a portfolio of RRBs. As a result, investing solely in RRBs would have almost
certainly threatened the financial stability of the plan, leading to an
increase in contribution rates and/or reduction in benefits. Accordingly,
equity investments were deemed necessary to finance the liabilities over
the long term. The RANVA model looked at total fund performance,
adjusted for relatively short-term risk. Although attractive in its simplicity,
RANVA was not appropriate to the circumstances of the CPPIB, where
total fund performance was considered over long horizons and manage-
ment was accountable solely for adding value. Plan performance was also
sensitive to other factors affecting cash flows, including policy choices,
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Figure 12.3 Forecast of net liabilities and investment earnings for the Canada
Pension Plan (CPP). Sources: Authors’ calculations derived from TOCA (2006)
and CPPIB (various years).
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demographic risks, economic risks, and financial risks as illustrated in
Figure 12.4. Many of these were beyond the control of the CPPIB.
The year 2005 proved to be a watershed for the CPPIB. While the Fund
was not the largest in Canada, it was recognized that its position in the
Canadian marketplace was becoming more significant, and the manage-
ment of the Fund had to evolve in response. David Denison (who became
the second president of the CPPIB in 2005), John Ilkiw (vice president of
Risk and Research) and Don Raymond (vice president of Public Market
Investments, PMI) developed a Risk–Return–Accountability Framework to
continue the Fund’s evolution. Their goal was to take Ambachtsheer’s
guidance to heart and begin to measure the right things, though perhaps
imperfectly.
The Risk–Return–Accountability Framework
The two control mechanisms that constitute the Risk–Return–Accountabil-
ity Framework, the CPP Reference Portfolio and the Active Risk Limit, were
Investment Returns
(default-free rate;
equity risk premium,
active return, etc.)
Demographics
(fertility, longevity, etc.)
Economics
(wage growth,
inflation, etc.)
Adjustment
risk
CPPIB helps
reduce adjustment risk
through its
investment decisions
Must be considered
when making
investment decisions,
but beyond CPPIB
influence
Figure 12.4 Factors affecting financial stability of the Canada Pension Plan (CPP).
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
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developed with the guidance provided in the 1997 Stewards’ Agreement.
The Stewards had proposed:
CPP funds [will] be prudently invested in a diversified portfolio of securities in the
best interest of contributors and beneficiaries. This new policy is consistent with the
investment policies of most other pension plans in Canada and the QPP. Prudent
assumptions indicate investing the fund in the market could generate an average
real return of 3.8 percent per year – i.e., a return of 3.8 percent above the rate of
inflation. . . . The fund will be managed professionally at arm’s length from govern-
ments by an investment board. The CPP Investment Board will be governed by a
qualified board of directors of up to 12 members. The Board will be accountable to
the public as well as governments and will report its investment results regularly to
Canadians. . . . The Board will be subject to broadly the same investment rules as
other pension funds in Canada. (HRDC 1997: 13)
The Reference Portfolio represents the Board of Directors’ long-term pas-
sive investment strategy, the point of comparison for determining manage-
ment’s value-adding strategies. It is a viable, low-cost, and investable
portfolio embodying the Stewards’ long-term risk tolerances and return
preferences. CPPIB’s management discretion to pursue value-adding stra-
tegies is controlled by an active risk limit that constrains tactical decisions, as
outlined in Figure 12.5. The CPPIB uses historical simulation VaR method-
ology to estimate active risk, incorporating at least 10 years of historical
data, at 90 percent confidence, over a 1-year time horizon. The methodolo-
gy produces results that are repeatable and verifiable, with underlying
assumptions that are transparent and not subject to management interpre-
tation. The 10-year history ensures that the scenario set incorporates
enough information to dampen business cycle effects. The 1-year invest-
ment horizon was chosen to provide a longer-term view of potential losses
than is common in institutions with a shorter-term view of the market.
The CPP Risk–Return–Accountability Framework clarifies stakeholder
accountabilities. The Board of Directors, acting on behalf of the Stewards,
is held accountable for policy decisions exposing the Fund to the many
factors affecting the Fund stability, including the desire to passively harvest
long-term capital market returns. Management is held accountable for
adding value relative to the Board of Directors’ long-term risk and return
expectations, as embodied by the Reference Portfolio. Unlike a typical
policy portfolio, the Reference Portfolio does not bind management to a
set of asset allocations. Rather, investment discretion is governed by an
active risk limit, not by bands around a target allocation. Numerous authors
have noted that policy portfolios tend to generate most of the returns and
risks (Brooks et al. 2001; Brinson, Hood, and Beebower 1986). Thus, the
choice of Reference Portfolio is the most important investment decision
made by the Board of Directors of the CPPIB.
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Designing the first Reference Portfolio
The first Reference Portfolio was designed in late 2005, reflecting the
Board’s risk preferences while still having a reasonable expectation of
delivering the actuarially required rate of return needed to fund the
plan. It was clear that a portfolio of RRBs would not provide sufficient
returns to sustain the Fund:
We then considered the risk factors driving CPP liabilities and the risk mitigating
characteristics of easy-to-implement, low cost exposures to broad market and pub-
licly priced asset classes: foreign equities, Canadian equities, Canadian real returns
bonds and Canadian nominal bonds. After considering their expected return
patterns and risk-mitigating behavior, and the legacy portfolio of Federal-provincial
non-marketable bonds, we settled on sub-asset class exposures that would be opti-
mal under reasonable capital market and liability behavior assumptions. (Ilkiw and
Raymond 2005)
The original CPP Reference Portfolio contained 65 percent equity (40
percent unhedged foreign equity and 25 percent Canadian equity) and
35 percent Canadian fixed income (25 percent Canadian nominal bonds
and 10 percent Canadian RRBs). This portfolio mix was reasonably ex-
pected to provide the level of return necessary to sustain the Fund over the
long term,4 and it represented the systematic risk deemed acceptable by
the Board.
Reference portfolio
• Viable strategy of investing in low-cost,
low-complexity, broadly diversified, public 
market indexes 
• Degree of asset-liability mismatch
implied in Stewards’ expression of risk
tolerance – currently 65 percent equity
and 35 percent debt    
• Risks: market, high quality
counterparties  
Active risk limit
•  Allow additional assets to be ‘put at risk’ to
 earn additional returns from active
 management  
•  Additional ‘assets at risk’ controlled by active
 risk limit measured as 90% VaR over 1
 year
•  Risks: market, alpha, credit, liquidity
Board of
Directors
Figure 12.5 Two levers governing strategic risk-taking at the Canada Pension Plan
Investment Board (CPPIB). Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
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The governance provisions of the Risk–Return–Accountability Frame-
work are contained in a suite of documents, both public and proprietary.
CPPIB’s constitution document is the ‘Statement of Investment Objec-
tives, Policies, Return Expectations and Risk Management for the Invest-
ment Portfolio of the Canada Pension Plan’ (CPPIB 2008), which
describes the CPPIB’s investment objectives, and describes the Reference
Portfolio, the associated Board Active Risk Limit, and the factors affecting
the ability of the CPP to meet its objectives. A companion document, the
‘Policy for the Measurement, Management, and Reporting of CPP Invest-
ment Portfolio Risk’ is a proprietary nonpublic document describing risk
management practices, defining the methodology for measuring VaR, and
specifying the active risk limit. These two documents, with other support-
ing proprietary documents, describe the Risk–Return–Accountability
Framework.
Total portfolio management
CPPIB believes it can best meet its objectives by managing the risk and
return characteristics of the total portfolio, rather than allocating capital in
a disjointed fashion to individual investment departments. As a result, the
Reference Portfolio design is not an exercise in traditional asset allocation,
but instead is designed to meet the long-term risk and return expectations
of the Board. The outcome of both exercises – asset allocation or total
portfolio design – is superficially the same. But the thought process, the
focus, and the governance models at CPPIB are risk-based – quite different
from a traditional asset allocation.
It should be noted that pension funds and other investors often hold
investment managers accountable for policy decisions and risk factors
beyond their control. The use of non-investable performance measures
(such as inflation plus benchmarks) is likely to lead to management ex-
plaining discrepancies from target to the stakeholders, or fund managers
being given credit unfairly for positive results. Neither circumstance is
under the fund manager’s control nor achieves the objective of holding
fund managers accountable for their investment decisions. The CPP Risk–
Return–Accountability Framework clarifies management’s accountabil-
ities. The Active Risk Limit, incorporating market and credit risk measured
relative to the Reference Portfolio, differs from the limit structures in place
at many other pension funds. Within the Active Risk Limit, CPPIB manage-
ment has the discretion to improve overall portfolio performance by in-
vesting in non-Reference Portfolio asset classes and by pursuing alpha-type
strategies. These strategies can add value through excess returns and/or
improved total portfolio diversification.
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As noted earlier, CPPIB expects to receive significant positive net con-
tributions over the next 10 years, causing assets to grow extraordinarily.
Therefore, the CPPIB is willing to take on opportunistic investments that
might appear disproportionate in the current portfolio, knowing its port-
folio will grow into such position over time. As a result, CPPIB pursues
opportunistic strategies not explicitly limited by allocations. Each such
opportunistic investment is analyzed in terms of its potential impact on
the risk and return profile of the total portfolio. Sizable real estate and
infrastructure investment opportunities, for example, arise infrequently.
So during the initial growth of the Fund, CPPIB management has not
governed these investment strategies by setting allocations. Instead, man-
agement reviews these opportunities as they arise and makes decisions
based on contributions such proposed investments would make to long-
term total portfolio risks and returns.
Risk budgeting
In order to enable the investment process to be truly risk-based, firm-wide,
and transparent, risk budgeting was the next iteration in the development
of the Risk–Return–Accountability Framework. Yet the concept of risk
budgeting means different things to different investors. For instance, Pear-
son (2002: 7) stated: ‘Narrowly defined, risk budgeting is a process of mea-
suring and decomposing risk, using the measures in asset-allocation
decisions, assigning portfolio managers risk budgets defined in terms of
these measures, and using these risk budgets in monitoring the asset
allocations and portfolio managers.’ By contrast, de Bever et al. (2000)
argued that a portfolio’s risk budget
is a measure of risk tolerance, defined as the loss one rarely expects to exceed over a
specific time horizon. The portfolio’s estimated ‘risk capital usage’ must fall within
this risk budget. The appropriate time horizon and the definition of ‘rarely’ depend
on the organization. Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (‘Teachers’) has a long-term
focus on managing surplus (assets-liabilities) and surplus risk, so we express our
‘surplus risk’ budget as the annual surplus loss we are prepared to absorb in the 1 in
100 worst-case outcome.
And still a third approach was offered by Brooks et al. (2001) who stated
that risk budgeting refers ‘to the process of establishing a) how much
investment risk should be taken; and b) where it is most efficient to take
it in order to maximize returns.’
The distinguishing feature of these definitions is not their similarity but
rather the linkage each makes to investment objectives. In an investment
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environment where managers are working to achieve a target asset alloca-
tion, assigning a fixed risk budget is simple in concept. By contrast, in an
environment where growth is rapid and the horizons of investment strate-
gies differ greatly, greater flexibility is required.
Risk budgeting at CPPIB
CPPIB management has been refining its forecasting of active risk since
the approval of the first Reference Portfolio in 2006. By the end of fiscal
2007, an informal risk budget for fiscal 2008 was negotiated between the
PMI department and the president. Over the course of fiscal 2008, the
PMI risk budget was measured and monitored as part of the regular risk
reports. In April 2008, a formal project was initiated, engaging an outside
consultant to determine the shape of risk budgeting at CPPIB. This
project was completed in August 2008, and its recommendations formed
the basis of the risk budgets put in place for fiscal 2010, starting in April
2009.
To develop risk budgeting at CPPIB, it was first necessary to clarify its
purpose. CPPIB embarked on a series of internal interviews to gather
viewpoints of different investment and finance groups. Many questions
arose regarding risk ‘philosophy’ including: Are risk budgets limits or
targets? And if a risk budget effectively represents a limit, is it a hard limit
or a soft limit? How granular does the analysis of results have to be? What
measures will be used to negotiate risk budgets and to track results? Could
investment departments allocate risk within their risk budgets to the
groups within their respective departments? What are potential outcome
scenarios, and what kind of discussions should result? How often are results
monitored and reported? And then, who takes responsibility for risk bud-
geting? In practice, there was widespread agreement on the value of risk
budgeting: when risk is a scarce resource, it is a clear advantage to the firm
to have a risk-budgeting framework in place and operating effectively. And
a main benefit of risk budgeting is the enhanced transparency it brings to
the process of making investment decisions.
Since the development of the Risk–Return–Accountability Framework
and the expansion of CPPIB’s active investment programs, there has been
a conscious consideration of the risk an investment adds to the Fund,
particularly in the case of large lumpy investments like real estate and
infrastructure. Risk budgeting enhances that consideration by first
providing a formal mechanism with a defined methodology for measuring
the risk return trade-off, and second, by reinforcing that risk is a scarce
resource which must be used in an efficient and cost-effective manner. In
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order for risk budgeting to be effective, the investment decision process
becomes a collaborative effort between the investment departments, Port-
folio Design and Investment Research (PDIR), and Investment Risk Man-
agement.
Budgets versus expectations
PMI was accustomed to a conscious consideration of the trade-offs between
risk and return, using an information ratio to measure the success of
internal and external managers. And since PMI had been operating
under an informal risk-budgeting regime for fiscal 2008, the implementa-
tion of a formal risk budget was almost a nonevent. Discussions with the
real estate investments (REI) and private investments (PI) groups were
more challenging. As discussed earlier, the CPPIB business model treats
alternative investments as opportunistic, without specific allocations, yet
strict risk budgeting would require explicit allocations to real estate, private
equity, and infrastructure. Accordingly, management developed a funda-
mental definition of risk budgeting that was more appropriate to the
opportunistic aspects of CPPIB’s investment strategy. The ‘Risk-Budgeting
Operating Framework’ is therefore ‘judgment-based, supported by analyt-
ics’ (Gunn, Livingstone, and Wyman 2008). A graphical overview of the
process appears in Figure 12.6.
Accountability for risk budgeting
The collective viewpoint of management at CPPIB is conveyed through the
Investment Planning Committee (IPC), chaired by the president, with its
membership comprised of the Investment SVPs, the COO, the CFO, and
the SVP of PDIR. PDIR is the working arm of the IPC, and as its name
suggests, is accountable for the research and analysis that motivate the
design of the Reference Portfolio and the Active Risk Limit, as well as the
active investments in the Fund. The risk tolerance of the firm as expressed
through risk budgeting is an integral part of portfolio design. PDIR has the
accountability for negotiating risk budgets with the investment depart-
ments on behalf of the IPC, and bringing them to the committee for
approval. Investment Risk Management is responsible for measuring out-
comes versus approved risk budgets and reporting the results to the invest-
ment departments and to management. Midyear adjustments, due to
unforeseen market events or responses to opportunistic investments, are
within PDIR’s accountability as well.
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Measurement of risk-budgeting outcomes
CPPIB uses VaR to measure risk relative to the CPP Reference Portfolio. It
was recognized that the investment departments do not manage their
investment activities using VaR. However, during the course of the risk-
budgeting design project, it was determined that it was better to be consis-
tent with the firm-wide risk measure than to design a different measure that
would then have to be reconciled to the firm-wide risk measure. A VaR
measure relative to the Reference Portfolio is used at the investment
department level to set the risk budgets in the performance agreements
and to monitor against them.
Investment department group risk budgets
In order to motivate the groups within the investment departments to
maximize their opportunities within the department risk budgets, the
SVPs may choose to disaggregate their risk budgets and assign group risk
budgets. These intradepartmental risk budgets may be in terms of risk
measures more appropriate for managing the activities of the various
groups. For example, groups within PMI have typically managed to a
dollar-based volatility target expressed as a standard deviation. The trans-
formation of a risk-budgeting target expressed in terms of VaR to another
volatility measure is usually straightforward, and then an allocation within
the department can be accomplished.
Benefits to the CPPIB of risk budgeting
As a management tool, risk budgeting will strengthen accountability and transpar-
ency. Improved accountability for risk-adjusted returns is provided through
Investment Department performance agreements that define departmental ac-
countability for risk and return, and in aggregate, align with commitments to the
Board for value added and risk. Transparency is improved through dialogue and
disclosure around risk and return expectations, initially as performance agree-
ments are negotiated, and subsequently as results are monitored, reported and
discussed, and decisions are made based on the outcomes. The decision frame-
work reveals the trade-offs between the opportunities within a department and
between departments, and the marginal risk and return impacts on the total
portfolio.
As an investment tool, risk budgeting will enhance efficiency and prioritization.
The ratio of risk vs. return highlights explicitly the cost of return – that is, howmuch
risk is expended to achieve a measured level of return – revealing the efficiency of
portfolio decisions. Risk, return and efficiency ratios provide an objective and
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transparent method of choosing one investment opportunity over another. (Gunn,
Livingstone, and Wyman 2008)
PDIR, the department responsible for recommending the Reference
Portfolio design and risk budgets, gained final approval for the risk-budget-
ing process at the August 2008 meeting of the IPC. Risk budgets are now
part of investment department Performance Agreements, which specify the
level of returns necessary to meet performance targets and are an integral
part of the business planning process.
PDIR kicked off fiscal 2010 risk budgeting in September 2008, 6 months
in advance of the start of fiscal 2010. Preliminary meetings were scheduled
with each of the investment department heads to discuss business plans for
the coming year. It was expected that these discussions would establish the
baseline for the fiscal 2010 risk budgets. But CPPIB found itself developing
its risk budgets in the midst of a financial perfect storm.
Risk budgeting to a moving target
Capital markets were crumbling, levered investors were selling into a falling
market, and regulators were struggling to address systemic issues that
threatened to swamp the global financial system. A flight to quality was
crushing the equity and credit markets. By the end of September 2008, the
S&P 500 had dropped to 1166.36, from its peak of 1565.15 as at October 8,
2007. CPPIB investment returns were 8.5 percent for the quarter ending
September 30, 2008.
CPPIB’s total portfolio approach meant risk budgeting required fore-
casts for a number of moving parts. But risk estimates were sensitive to the
value of assets held in the portfolio, the volatility of the asset prices, and to
the interdependencies between the asset prices. And all of these variables
were changing dramatically during the market upheaval. And when corre-
lations between assets increase dramatically during a crisis, diversification
benefits disappear.
Private and public equity, for example, were considered a single asset
class over the long term and were treated as such when rebalancing the
portfolio. But in such volatile markets, how much equity would CPPIB
have at the beginning of the coming fiscal year? Public equity was revalued
continually, and forecasts readily available, but private equity was re-
valued infrequently and forecasts were difficult to develop. Public markets,
represented by the S&P 500, had dropped a further 22.56 percent between
September and December. Would private equity valuations follow? Estimat-
ing the starting value of these assets for the coming fiscal year had become
challenging.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 2/8/2010, SPi
236 Sterling Gunn and Tracy Livingstone
The markets continued to drop. CPPIB reported third quarter returns as
of December 31, 2008 of 6.7 percent – and assets under management
were now $108.9B CAD, down from $122.8B CAD at March 31, 2008.
Elsewhere, public reports and market intelligence indicated many other
funds, in efforts to raise cash, were being forced to sell and realize signifi-
cant losses. CPPIB management was monitoring the effects of the market
downturn on its own balance sheet, as part of an effort to ‘keep its powder
dry.’ Because of its balance sheet flexibility, a luxury lost to many other
fund managers, CPPIB management felt well positioned to take advantage
of market opportunities in the coming year.
Performance agreements
PMI
The performance agreement for active strategies within PMI included a
fixed-dollar risk budget. Consistent with being a purely active manager,
PMI was allocated risk, not assets, and so no initial asset value was required
to set the fiscal 2010 performance agreement. The level of risk was a stretch
target for PMI, intended to encourage PMI to find value-adding opportu-
nities. The return hurdles were set to reward PMI for achieving high
quantile realized information ratios (the ratio of excess return relative to
risk taken), so that PMI was incentivized to take on only those transactions
that were expected to pay for the risks taken.
REI
The REI department was pursuing an opportunistic investment strategy in
private real estate, with long-term multiyear objectives. There were a
number of phases in the development of the REI performance agreement.
Changes in the REI portfolio could arise from changes in the value of
existing assets, and from the acquisition of new assets. So PDIR and REI
reviewed the real estate deal pipeline, developing a sense of the potential
to originate new real estate assets in fiscal 2010. The result was a set of low,
mid, and high net new real estate asset origination projects. PDIR and REI
then worked to estimate the value of the real estate portfolio at the
beginning of fiscal 2010. These two factors, the initial starting value plus
the value of net new real estate assets, were used to estimate the low, mid,
and high values of the real estate portfolio. PDIR also reviewed the
balance sheet implications of these scenarios, including the funding stra-
tegies.
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PI
The PI group is responsible for private equity, infrastructure, and private
debt. PDIR worked with PI to estimate low, mid, and high scenarios for the
dollars invested of the private equity, infrastructure, and private debt
portfolios. Again, PDIR also reviewed the balance sheet implications of
these scenarios, including funding strategies. Once these individual scenar-
ios were developed, PDIR then estimated a number of risk measures
associated with these strategies.
Total fund risk budget
PDIR estimated the stand-alone risk measure for each department. These
numbers were somewhat comparable to the risk budget allocated to PMI.
PDIR then combined the low, mid, and high scenarios of the departments,
and then for each resulting scenario measured the risk contribution each
department made to the active portfolio and to the total Fund. This analysis
provides a sense of the range of risk contributions each department might
make. These contribution measures also provide insights into the strategies
diversification benefits for the total and active portfolios.
IPC approval
By December, having performed a number of risk-budget iterations in
response to the volatile capital markets, CPPIB management had become
proficient at updating and revising its risk budget forecasts. In January
2009, the IPC accepted the recommended risk budgets, which anticipated
the market would present a number of opportunities as other investors
were forced to sell. Board approval was gained in February 2009.
Conclusion
The mission of CPPIB is to safeguard the CPP for 16 million participants by
establishing a clear link between investment objectives and outcomes, and
between actions and accountability. This chapter has reviewed the CPP and
CPPIB’s history, and the risk-budgeting design process to illustrate why risk
budgeting was seen as an appropriate course of action, as well as why the
strict risk-budgeting framework was reworked to fit within the opportunis-
tic business model for illiquid assets in place at CPPIB. Risk budgeting is a
familiar construct in the capital market sector, and the PMI group has
always worked within a ‘risk budget,’ looking at the quantitative measures
of volatility and risk in the context of investment decisions. The PI and REI
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groups have considered the implications of risk in their investment deci-
sions, but on a more qualitative basis. Changing the business model to fit
within a risk-budgeting framework was never considered; rather risk bud-
geting was changed to fit the business model.
In an environment where risk is a scarce resource, prioritization of scant
resources and increased efficiency in the use of risk can only have positive
implications. While formal risk budgeting has only been in place for a short
time at the CPPIB, it is expected that it will provide real and measurable
benefits. As a management tool, the risk-budgeting process allows CPPIB to
define accountabilities clearly and increase transparency into the trade-offs
implicit in investment decisions.
Notes
1 This section draws on Little (2008).
2 Amendments to the Canadian constitution require approval by the Canadian
House of Commons, the Canadian Senate, and two-thirds majority of the provin-
cial legislatures representing at least 50 percent of the population.
3 The OCA forecasts that no more than approximately 34 percent of investment
earnings will be needed to pay benefits. Real growth is expected to slow, but a sale
of assets is not anticipated.
4 Although the Stewards’ Agreement in 1997 specified a return of 3.8 percent, the
Chief Actuary later determined that a real return of 4.2 percent was necessary.
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